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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Cullen D. Seltzer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The past year has been an active one for the Virginia courts
and General Assembly in the areas of criminal law and procedure. Developments include cases regarding the allowance of
expert assistance to indigent criminal defendants and a
defendant's right to a new trial based on after-discovered evidence. Driving under the influence [DUI] defendants are no
longer entitled to their choice of a blood or breath test as a
function of the implied consent law, and for felons convicted of
committing an offense after December 31, 1994, parole is no
longer an option. This article surveys these and other legislative and judicial developments in Virginia criminal law. Although this article is intended to survey significant developments over the past year, the reader is cautioned to bear in
mind several important caveats.
First, the constraints of time and publication schedules prohibit a survey of cases and legislative developments before April
* Assistant Public Defender, Office of the Public Defender, Richmond, Virginia;
BA, 1990, Mary Washington College; J.D., 1993, University of Richmond School of
Law.
The author is indebted to a number of people for their assistance, knowing or
otherwise, in the preparation of this survey. The general structure of the article is
borrowed from that employed by Steven D. Benjamin who wrote a survey of Criminal
Law in Virginia for this publication two years ago. The Office of the Public Defender
for the City of Richmond, which has the good fortune to have employed many talented and insightful attorneys, has aided not only in providing an environment which
values and requires thoughtful consideration of developing law, but in providing
timely and concise summaries of recent case law. Deputy Public Defender Susan
Hansen and Assistant Public Defenders Maureen White and Cheryl Frydrychowski
were of particular assistance in this regard. All of the attorneys and staff in
Richmond's Office of the Public Defender aided by sharing their experiences with and
insight into the practice of criminal law. Finally, my greatest debt is owed to Rosemary Seltzer, my wife, without whose patience and support I could not have completed this work.

952

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:951

1994 and after April 1995. Significantly, by the time this article
is published, legislative enactments effective July 1, 1995 will
have been in effect for several months and are not discussed in
this article. Second, this article does not purport to survey the
development of the criminal law in the federal courts even
though those courts do have occasion to interpret state law, as
well as federal constitutional law, which is frequently binding
upon, and certainly persuasive in, the Virginia courts. Third,
and finally, this author's views of what developments are significant, and what the implications of those developments may be,
are those of the author alone; there is no real substitute for
reading the law as the law-makers, from whatever branch of
government they may be, have written it.

II.

FOURTH AMENDMENT'

A. Probable Cause
In Jones v. Commonwealth,2 the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reversed a conviction for possession of cocaine where the contraband was discovered on the defendant's person incident to an
arrest for trespassing, but the court held that the police did not
have probable cause for the arrest. The arresting officer was
told by the defendant and bystanders that the defendant was
not trespassing, but was visiting a friend who lived at the

1. The sections denoted by reference to one of the first ten amendments to the
federal Constitution are, of course, simply a shorthand means of describing what
component of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause is at issue. This is
necessarily so because the first ten amendments to the federal Constitution do not
apply to the states; rather many of the protections afforded by those amendments
have been incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which expressly applies to the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)
("Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the
American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a
right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal
court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.") (emphasis added);
JEROLD H. ISRAEL, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION 33-34 (1993)

("The first eight amendments were enacted as limitations solely upon the federal
government.") The modern trend in incorporation theory is that of "selective
incorporation" whereby rights deemed to be "fundamental" are "incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states to the same extent that [they]
appl[y] to the federal government." Id. at 43.
2. 18 Va. App. 229, 443 S.E.2d 189 (1994).
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apartment complex, which was posted "No Trespassing."3 These
statements rendered unreasonable the officer's belief that the
defendant was trespassing.4 That the defendant fled when approached by the police did not give rise to an independent basis
for probable cause that the defendant was committing a crime.5
The court of appeals also affirmed that administrative searches, even in areas which are closely regulated by the state such
as mining, may be conducted without probable cause only if
some statutory or regulatory provision authorizes the search.6
Correctional officers who searched an uncooperative inmate,
based on probable cause, permissibly did so by using a medical
device designed for opening a person's jaw.' The device, a "jawscrew," was inserted into a prisoner's mouth when the prisoner
refused to open his mouth, which officials believed to contain
contraband, and only after other physical efforts to open the
prisoner's mouth had been exhausted.' The court took pains to
note that the device was used by corrections officers in the
manner in which the device was intended to be used-to open a
person's mouth.9
B. Reasonable Articulable Suspicion of Crime-The Terry Stop
In Logan v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals, sitting en
banc, reversed a panel decision of that court and held that a
police officer could rely upon her experience and training in
concluding that a broken vent window on a popular make of
automobile was indicia that the vehicle had been stolen. The
police officer in question was a six year veteran of the police
force, had recovered 200 stolen vehicles, knew the Jeep
Wagoneer to be a popular vehicle among car thieves, and that

3. Id. at 230-31, 443 S.E.2d at 190.
4. Id. at 232-33, 443 S.E.2d at 191.
5. Id. at 233, 443 S.E.2d at 191.
6. Burgan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 172, 450 S.E.2d 177 (1994).
7. Archer v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 87, 455 S.E.2d 280 (1995).
8. Id. at 89, 455 S.E.2d at 281.
9. Id. at 93, 455 S.E.2d at 283.
10. 19 Va. App. 437, 452 S.E.2d 364 (en banc), rev'g, 18 Va. App. 136, 442 S.E.2d
258 (1994).
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breaking vent windows was a common means of entry into such
vehicles."
The court of appeals addressed the question of successive
stops in Jha v. Commonwealth.'2 There, police initially stopped
the defendant based on the suspicious circumstances surrounding his late-night presence near a closed store. 3 On investigation of Jha, police discovered nothing.'4 Jha then told
police that he would be leaving in a particular direction. 5
When he left in a different direction, and police discovered
other suspicious circumstances near where Jha had last been
seen, they stopped him again. 6 Evidence adduced during this
second stop was used against Jha during his criminal trial, and
Jha protested that the second stop was unlawful.'7 The court
disagreed and stated, "[o]nce police found nothing illegal from
the first stop, they were not required to ignore the facts that
triggered it, and thus, were not precluded from using those
facts in establishing probable cause for the second detention." 8
The court of appeals also held in Peguese v. Commonwealth9 that a search of the driver of a car is permissible to
secure the officer's safety when the car is stopped to investigate
the possible drug activity of the passenger. The court held that
"because appellant's proximity to the [drug] buy and because of
his association with [the person suspected of buying drugs],
[police reasonably concluded that the] appellant was a partici-

11. Id. at 439-40, 452 S.E.2d at 366.
12. 18 Va. App. 349, 444 S.E.2d 258 (1994).
13. Id. at 350-51, 444 S.E.2d at 259.
14. Id. at 351, 444 S.E.2d at 259.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 351, 444 S.E.2d at 260.
18. Id. at 354, 444 S.E.2d at 260. Note that the court used the term "probable
cause" to describe the information obtained by police for the second stop. That characterization seems to suggest that Jha was under arrest for a crime at the time of the
second stop, rather than simply investigatively detained. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968). In setting out the applicable legal standards, however, the court stated that
in order to conduct "[an investigatory stop . . . [the police must have] a reasonable
suspicion that the defendant is engaged in criminal activity." Jha, 18 Va. App. at
353, 444 S.E.2d at 260. In light of the fact that Jha's challenge was to the sufficiency
of the evidence to prove an "articulable suspicion" one must assume that the holding
of the case applies to Terry stops. Nothing in the opinion, however, suggests that the
logic behind Jha would have any less force if applied in a probable cause context.
19. 19 Va. App. 349, 451 S.E.2d 412 (1994).
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pant in the transaction and possibly armed and dangerous
[which in turn] gave rise to an 'inference of dangerousness . .. 20
C. Community-CaretakerFunction
Last year, Virginia for the first time recognized an additional
exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. In Barrett v. Commonwealth,2 the court of appeals, en
banc, held that the
duty of the police embraces the function of maintaining
public order and providing necessary assistance to persons
in need or distress. An officer who harbors a reasonable and
articulable suspicion, based upon observed facts or a credible report, that a citizen is in distress or in need of assistance, may lawfully effect an appropriately brief and limited
seizure for the purpose of investigating that suspicion and
rendering aid.'
The court relied in part on the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion
in Cady v. Dombrowski' for the proposition that the search in
that case was held to be permissible because it was "'totally
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of
evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute."'" One
Barrett dissenter observed that Cady and the other U.S.
Supreme Court cases cited by the majority in support of a community-caretaking exception, arose "in the context of police
activities25 occurring after an otherwise valid seizure of an automobile."

20. Id. at 353, 451 S.E.2d at 414. The dissent disagreed and observed: "The majority concludes that a police officer may reasonably believe that one is armed and
dangerous from one's presence at a suspected drug transaction and the suspicion that
one's companion possesses an unknown controlled substance. Existing law does not, in
my opinion, extend so far." Id. at 354, 451 S.E.2d at 414-15 (Barrow, J., dissenting).
For good or for ill, the law apparently does so extend now.
21. 18 Va. App. 773, 447 S.E.2d 243 (1994).
22. Id. at 778, 447 S.E.2d at 246 (emphasis added).
23. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
24. Barrett, 18 Va. App. at 777, 447 S.E.2d at 245 (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at

441).
25. Id. at 779, 447 S.E.2d at 247 (Elder, J., dissenting).
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Of the two dissenting opinions in Barrett, one complained
that "community-caretaking" was too nebulous a concept to permit what the majority conceded was a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.2 6 The other dissenting opinion
did not quarrel with the notion of community-caretaking in
general, but rather took issue with the majority's conclusion
that the trooper in this case had a reasonable suspicion that
the defendant's vehicle was in distress. The trooper, who first
saw Barrett's vehicle stopped on the shoulder of a roadway, and
then moving slowly, partly on the shoulder and partly on
private property, testified that "it seemed odd since it was [his]
impression that the vehicle could have pulled onto the roadway."" If that were so, wondered the dissent, how could the
trooper have believed the vehicle or its occupants were in
distress?2 9
Upon reviewing the en banc decision of the court of appeals,
the Supreme Court of Virginia answered that question in the
negative." The supreme court held that Barrett's "odd" conduct, without more, was insufficient to give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that he was in need of police assistance."' The supreme court, therefore, found it unnecessary to reach the question of whether a "community-caretaker" doctrine exists. 2 That
notwithstanding, the supreme court, unlike the court of appeals,
declined to characterize the community-caretaker doctrine as
following from Cady v. Dombrowski.3 3 Rather, the supreme
court noted that Cady, South Dakota v. Opperman,' and Colorado v. Bertrine,35 all of which were cited by the court of appeals, each "involved the admissibility of incriminating evidence
discovered during a standard police procedure [not a "community-caretaking" stop] of inventorying property that had properly

26. Id. (Elder, J. dissenting).
27. Id. at 780, 447 S.E.2d at 247 (Coleman, J., dissenting).
28. Id. (Coleman, J., dissenting).
29. Id. (Coleman, J., dissenting).
30. Barrett v. Commonwealth, No. 941711, 1995 WL 545886 (Va. Sept. 16, 1995).
Note that discussion of this opinion is the sole case in this survey which was handed
down after April 1995.
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id.
33. 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
34. 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
35. 479 U.S. 367 (1976).
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been taken into custody. 6 The supreme court characterized the
Commonwealth's position as urging "an exten[sion] of [Cady] to
validate investigative stops and detentions of persons not evidently engaged in criminal activity, but who apparently need
some policy assistance. 7 In light of the supreme court's holding that the trooper in Barrett did not have a reasonable
suspicion that Barrett was in distress, the court' discussion of
the import of Cady, Opperman and Bertrine can only be characterized as dicta, albeit highly persuasive di6ta given the unanimity of the supreme court's decision.
The court of appeals in Barrett, however, clearly indicated
that a majority of that court believes that community-caretaker
is the law. Indeed, the loss to the court of appeals of Judges
Koontz and Barrow has resulted in two fewer court of appeals
votes for the Barrett dissenters." Since the supreme court declined to hold community-caretaker invalid per se, the court of
appeals remains free to declare it the law in an appropriate
case. Given the clear indication of a majority of the court of
appeals to embrace community-caretaker in what was a very
close case, defense counsel would do well to prepare for future
community-caretaker cases with an eye towards that doctrine's
continued vitality. Defense counsel would also do well, given
that the court of appeals demonstrated an inclination to fashion
a hypothetical basis for a caretaker stop, to establish precisely
what the officer suspects might be awry.39 Similarly

36. Barrett, 1995 WL 545886, at *2.
37. Id.
38. Note that Justice Koontz did not participate in the decision of Barrett in the
supreme court. The opinion was authored by Justice Koontz's predecessor, Justice
Whiting who "prepared the opinion in this case prior to the effective date of this
retirement on August 12, 1995." Id. at *1 n.1.
39. The court of appeals majority recited that "Lyons pulled behind the [moving]
truck and activated his flashing lights. He testified that his only purpose was to determine whether the driver was experiencing mechanical problems and not to investigate any perceived violation of the law." Barrett v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 773,
774, 447 S.E.2d 243, 244 (1994). The majority stated, without suggesting that these
theories were in fact in the trooper's mind,
The trooper reasonably concluded that the occupants of the truck might
need help. The driver could have been easing a malfunctioning truck up
the shoulder, hoping to find assistance. The occupants could have been
injured or sick. They might have been people whose safety would be
jeopardized by being stranded on the highway. All these possibilities were
consistent with the situation confronting Trooper Lyons. Had he simply
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Commonwealth's attorneys would do well to remember that
community-caretaker may yet result in the admission of evidence otherwise unlawfully obtained.
From the discussion by the Judges and Justices of the appellate courts, two more things about the new community-caretaker exception can be fairly predicted. First, the analytical paradigm employed in Terry stop cases, reasonable articulable suspicion, will be employed in caretaker cases. Second, the dispute
over what facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion"° remains a
hotly contested one.
D. Seizure
The long-standing test for determining whether a person is
seized is to examine whether a reasonable person in the
defendant's position would feel free to leave the police.41 Applying that test, however, has proved more troublesome. The
court of appeals demonstrated its trouble with this analytical
paradigm with its apparently inconsistent conclusions in two
recent cases. In Watson v. Commonwealth,4 2 the court concluded that a person initially stopped by police because of his vague
resemblance to a suspect in a drug case, but who was later
released and instructed to drive his own car to another location
where police were waiting and where he was immediately arrested, was seized for the entire time, including the time when
Watson was driving his own car. The key to the court's ruling

passed by without inquiry or the offer of assistance, he would have failed
in his duty to offer the alert, kindly helping hand that our society rightly
expects of its police officers.
Id. at 778, 447 S.E.2d at 246.
Note also, however, that an officer's subjective impressions are not what give
rise to lawful cause for a seizure; rather the test is one of objeQtive reasonableness.
See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); Limonja v. Commonwealth, 8
Va. App. 532, 537-38, 383 S.E.2d 476, 480 (1989).
40. See supra note 10-11 and accompanying text (discussing Logan v. Commonwealth).
41. "A voluntary police-citizen encounter becomes a seizure for Fourth Amendment
purposes 'only if, in view of all of the circumstances . .. a reasonable person would
have believed that he was not free to leave.' Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va.
App. 162, 170, 455 S.E.2d 744, 747 (1995) (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).
42. 19 Va. App. 659, 454 S.E.2d 358 (1995).
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was that Watson was allowed to drive only after agreeing to
accompany police to the other location, and that his car was
flanked by police cars on the way to the other location.'
By contrast, in Johnson v. Commonwealth," police officers
who were conducting a valid Terry investigative stop of the
defendant did not convert that stop into a full blown arrest by
ordering the defendant out of his vehicle and placing him in
handcuffs. Johnson argued that once placed in handcuffs, the
subsequent, purportedly consensual, search of his person was
unlawful.' The court reasoned that because "[i]t was dark
[and] Johnson is a large, powerful man ... suspected of carrying a weapon," the restraint employed by the police did not
elevate the Terry stop to a more intrusive full-blown arrest.4 6
The effect of the Johnson and Watson holdings is to suggest
that sometimes a defendant can be closely restrained and plainly not free to leave, and still not be under arrest, and depending on the circumstances, a defendant can actually be driving
his own car, alone, and be seized. These cases provide ample
ammunition to defense counsel and prosecutors alike, in the ongoing battle regarding what constitutes an arrest. But these
cases provide little hope that arrests, temporary detentions, and
consensual non-Fourth Amendment implicating encounters, will
be clearly and predictably distinguishable anytime soon.'
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT
Last year, the court of appeals affirmed that a seventeenyear-old juvenile need not necessarily have the presence of a
parent or legal counsel in order to voluntarily make statements
43. Id. at 661, 454 S.E.2d at 360.
44. 20 Va. App. 49, 455 S.E.2d 261 (1995).
45. Id. at 53, 455 S.E.2d at 263-64. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 501
(1983) (holding that voluntarily made statements that are the product of an illegal
arrest are inadmissible.)
46. Johnson, 20 Va. App. at 55, 455 S.E.2d at 265. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 851, 856-57, 434 S.E.2d 319, 323 (1993) (requiring that police
procedures and investigative methods attendant to a Terry stop be calculated to confirm or dispel suspicion of crime quickly and with minimal intrusion).
47. See Wechsler v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 162, 455 S.E.2d 744, (1995) for
a concise explanation of the analytical distinctions between consensual encounters,
investigative detentions based on reasonable suspicion, and arrests based on probable
cause.
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to police.' Similarly, a defendant in custody, who executed a
rights waiver, was held to have voluntarily confessed, notwithstanding statements by the state police investigator that "you
and I are the only one[s] in the room" and that the investigator
"was not going to spill [his] guts" about the defendant. 9 A defendant who invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent during a non-custodial interrogation, but who twelve days
later made inculpatory statements, voluntarily made the statements, and they were admissible against him at his trial."
Central to the court's ruling was that the first encounter with
the police was voluntary, and that twelve days lapsed between
the first and second encounters during which time the defendant was not incarcerated.5'
In Husske v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals came to
a contrary conclusion regarding the admissibility of the
defendant's inculpatory statements. Husske was first convicted
of two "peeping-tom" violations, for which offenses he received
suspended jail sentences.53 The court of appeals, on review of
the record, found that a condition of the suspended sentences
was that Husske fully participate in counseling sessions with a
local social service agency, the progress of which was to be
reported to the general district court where Husske was first
convicted.' During one counseling session, Husske's wife urged
Husske to tell his counselor what was really bothering him.55
After additional probing by the counselor, Husske confessed to
a rape.5 6 The counselor reported Husske's admission to the
authorities who in turn prosecuted Husske for that offense for

48. Roberts v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 554, 445 S.E.2d 709 (1994).
49. Gwaltney v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 468, 471, 452 S.E.2d 687, 689
(1995).
50. Tipton v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 832, 447 S.E.2d 539 (1994).
51. Id. at 834-36, 447 S.E.2d 540-42.
52. 19 Va. App. 30, 448 S.E.2d 331 (1994). This case has been argued before the
court of appeals en banc, but as yet no decision affirming or reversing the panel
decision has been handed down.
53. Id. at 47, 448 S.E.2d at 340.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 48, 448 S.E.2d at 341.
56. Id.
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which Husske was convicted." On appeal Husske challenged
the admissibility of his confession. 5
The court of appeals concluded that Husske's participation in
the counseling program was compulsory as a function of his
suspended sentence on the "peeping-tom" charges, and held that
the statement was admitted against Husske in violation of his
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent.59 The court reasoned
that by forcing Husske to choose between active jail time, if his
suspended sentence were revoked for non-compliance with
court-ordered counseling, and exercising his right to remain silent, was too coercive an environment in which to make a
knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to remain silent.0
In Hines v. Commonwealth,6 the court of appeals again considered the application of the Fifth Amendment in the context
of the Miranda decision. During his interrogation, Hines "became aggravated and said he wanted to return to his jail cell
and speak with his attorney."" The interrogating detective
then asked Hines "whether [Hines was] going to be a witness
or a defendant in the matter."63 Hines then made incriminating statements. Later, another detective who was in the room
for the entire discussion asked Hines if he understood his
Miranda rights, and Hines replied that he did.' Hines then
made additional incriminating statements regarding the crime
the second detective was investigating.65 The court of appeals
held that the first detective's inquiry regarding whether Hines
was to be a witness or a defendant was "reinitiation [by the
officer] of the dialogue that Hines sought to terminate."66 The

57. Id. at 48, 448 S.E.2d at 341-42.
58. Id.

59. Id. at 54, 448 S.E.2d at 345.
60. Id. at 52, 448 S.E.2d at 343.
61. Hines v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 218, 450 S.E.2d 403 (1994). See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that interrogation of a defendant
must cease on invocation by the defendant of the right to counsel). Once an accused
has invoked the right to counsel, the accused is not subject to re-interrogation absent
the provision of counsel to the accused or re-initiation of the interrogation by the
accused. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981).
62. Hines, 19 Va. App. at 220, 450 S.E.2d at 403.
63. Id.

64. Id.
65. Id. at 220, 450 S.E.2d at 404.
66. Id. at 221, 450 S.E.2d at 404.
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statement by the detective was also held to be interrogation in
light of the fact that the detective knew, or should have known,
that the statement was "'reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect." 7 Therefore, all of the
statements, including the statement made after the second
detective re-inquired regarding Hines's understanding of his
Miranda rights, were inadmissible."
IV. SIXTH AMENDMENT

Relying on the recent United States Supreme Court case of
Nichols v. United States,6 9 the court of appeals affirmed a con7° where the certified copy of the
viction for second-offense DUI
prior conviction indicated that the defendant was represented
by counsel, but did not explicitly show that his plea of guilty
was knowing and voluntary.7 ' Applying the "presumption of
regularity," the court of appeals held that:
[T]he Commonwealth satisfies its burden of going forward
when it produces a properly certified conviction from a
court of competent jurisdiction which appears on its face to
be a valid final judgment, provided that in all felony cases
and those misdemeanor proceedings where imprisonment

67. Id. at 222, 450 S.E.2d at 405 (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,
301 (1980) (footnote omitted)).
68. Id.
When the officer continued the dialogue without first giving Hines access
to his lawyer, the statements that he elicited did not follow upon a valid
waiver of Hines's Fifth Amendment rights. "It is best presumed that any
subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at
the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of the 'inherently compelling pressures' [of custodial interrogation] and not the purely voluntary
choice of the suspect."
Id. (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988)); see also Commonwealth v. Fowler, 34 Va. Cir. 25 (Alexandria City 1994) (holding that invocation of
right to counsel rendered all subsequent statements inadmissible). Compare the decision in Hines with the holding in Bailey v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 236, 456
S.E.2d 144 (1995), where the defendant was represented by counsel prior to making a
statement to police, but the statement was initiated by the defendant and the defendant signed a waiver. The defendant's subsequent statement, therefore, was admissible.
69. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
70. Driving under the influence of alcohol or other intoxicants. VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-266 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
71. James v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 746, 446 S.E.2d 900 (1994).
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resulted, there is evidence establishing that the defendant
was represented by or properly waived counsel in the earlier criminal proceeding.72
Later, in Griswold v. Commonwealth,73 the court of appeals
interpreted Nichols to require proof that a prior misdemeanor
conviction, used to enhance punishment, was counseled regardless of whether the conviction resulted in actual or suspended
jail time.74 The court of appeals interpreted the language "'sentenced to a term of imprisonment' to include a jail sentence
imposed and conditionally suspended."75 Judge Koontz, now
Justice Koontz of the Supreme Court of Virginia, dissented and
argued that a suspended jail sentence is "the mere threat of
imprisonment," which Scott v. Illinois had held to be the
threshold beyond which a defendant had no constitutional right
to appointed counsel.76 Accordingly, Judge Koontz would have
permitted a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction to be
used to enhance punishment in a future case so long as the
prior conviction did not result in an actual jail sentence."
Even by the majority's reasoning, a prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction which resulted in neither actual nor suspended jail time would be admissible in a future proceeding to enhance punishment. Therefore, in jurisdictions where suspended
jail time is rarely revoked for repeat misdemeanants, prosecutors would do well to seek no jail time at all and thereby avoid
the requirement in a future proceeding of proving that the first
conviction was counseled.
Griswold also stands for the proposition that proof of a waiver of counsel must be clear and that the Commonwealth bears

72. Id. at 746, 446 S.E.2d at 904 (citing Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114
(1967)). "A silent record or the mere naked assertion by an accused that his prior
counseled plea was not made knowingly and intelligently is insufficient (to render the
prior conviction inadmissible]." Id.
73. 19 Va. App. 477, 453 S.E.2d 287 (1995).
74. Id. at 482, 453 S.E.2d at 289-90. By order dated March 9, 1995, the court of
appeals agreed to-hear this case en banc. No opinion has, at the time of this writing,
been issued from the full court of appeals.
75. Id. at 482, 453 S.E.2d at 289 (citing United States v. Reilley, 948 F.2d 648,
653-54 (10th Cir. 1991)).
76. Id. at 485-86, 453 S.E.2d at 291-92. (Koontz, J., dissenting) (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)).
77. Id. (Koontz, J., dissenting).
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that burden. Even though the warrant indicating the prior conviction was marked that the defendant pled guilty "per p/a,"
which the trial judge understood to mean "plea agreement," the
trial judge could not take judicial notice that the local
Commonwealth's Attorney would not enter into a plea agreement with an uncounseled defendant and therefore that some
attorney must have appeared on behalf of the defendant."
A similar inquiry was also resolved in favor of the defendant
in Harris v. Commonwealth.79 Harris was forty-two years old,
college-educated and, though not licensed to practice law, in
fact had a law degree."0 The record revealed that Harris "possessed a great deal of confidence in his ability to represent himself and professed his capabilities to the trial court.""' Moreover, Harris signed a form waiving his right to counsel in the
general district court.8 No such waiver was signed in the circuit court, however, and in light of the fact that the circuit
court trial was de novo and included different rules and procedures particularly the right to trial by jury, the trial court was
required to "independent[ly] inquir[e] as to whether Harris
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel."8 The
trial judge's failure to so inquire required reversal. '
V. DUE PROCESS OF LAW

Husske v. Commonwealth,85 discussed above with regard to
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, was
also notable for its contribution to the body of law providing for
indigent persons' access to the tools of a proper defense. In
Husske, the government relied in large part on DNA evidence
to link Husske to a rape committed by a man the victim was
unable to identify except in very general terms." Before trial,
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
487-88
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 484, 453 S.E.2d at 290-91.
20 Va. App. 194, 455 S.E.2d 759 (1995).
Id. at 196, 455 S.E.2d at 760.
Id. at 198, 455 S.E.2d at 761.
Id. at 196, 455 S.E.2d at 760.
Id. at 198, 455 S.E.2d at 761 (citing Van Zant v. Gondles, 596 F. Supp. 484,
(E.D. Va. 1983)).
Id. at 199, 455 S.E.2d at 761.
19 Va. App. 30, 448 S.E.2d 331 (1994).
Id. at 32-33, 448 S.E.2d at 332-33.
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Husske asked for the appointment of an expert, in DNA to assist him at trial."7 The trial judge refused, but appointed as
co-counsel "the most knowledgeable member of the local bar in
the area of forensic DNA application."88 On appeal, the court
of appeals relied on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Ake v.
Oklahoma for the proposition that once an indigent defendant
in a case makes a proper showing of the need for expert assistance, the trial judge deprives the defendant of due process of
law in refusing to provide such an expert.89 Although the defendant is not entitled to the expert of his choice, the court of
appeals rejected the theory that Ake is limited in its application
to death penalty cases or cases involving psychiatric evidence." The court observed that DNA science is complicated,
such that the Commonwealth secured the presence of two experts at trial, and that Husske had proffered hundreds of pages
of cases and transcripts relating to specific areas of controversy
in DNA science." At this writing, the court of appeals has
heard oral argument in this case en banc, but no decision has
been handed down. 2
The court of appeals also affirmed that an indigent defendant
is entitled to a transcript of his trial, which ended in a mistrial, if the Commonwealth later attempts to re-try the defendant. 3 Central to the court's ruling was that the defendant
needed a transcript to mount an effective defense in the second
trial because the victim's testimony from the first trial differed

87. Id. at 32, 448 S.E.2d at 332.
88. Id. at 32, 448 S.E.2d at 333.
89. Id. at 33-34, 448 S.E.2d at 333-34 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68
(1985)).
90. Id. at 34-35, 448 S.E.2d at 333-34.
91. Id. at 44-46, 448 S.E.2d at 339-40; see also Commonwealth v. Russell, 33 Va.
Cir. 436 (Fairfax County 1994) (holding that a defendant is not constitutionally entitled to an opportunity to make an ex parte showing of a need for expert assistance,
even if the denial of an ex parte hearing results in disclosure of potential defenses to
the Commonwealth's Attorney).
92. Telephone Interview with Clerk's office of the Virginia Court of Appeals (June
26, 1995). Compare Husske with the decision in Chichester v. Commonwealth, 248 Va.
311, 448 S.E.2d 638 (1994), handed down the same month, which concluded that the
defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of a court-appointed investigator where the defendant did not state in what way the lack of investigative
help violated his Sixth Amendment rights.
93. Anderson v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 208, 450 S.E.2d 394 (1994).
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in some respects from his testimony at the second trial.9 4 The
trial judge's complaint that the public defender's office has a
budget of its own, and could therefore presumably afford a
transcript, was held to be an insufficient reason to deny Anderson a transcript at the court's expense.95
Although initially observing that a defendant has no general
constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, the court of
appeals construed Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution to afford a state constitution due process right to "call for
evidence in his favor," including the right of a defendant to
enter onto the property of a third party to view and photograph
a crime scene.96 That holding, in Henshaw v. Commonwealth,
represents a significant departure from prior court holdings
that the protections afforded by the Virginia Constitution's
guarantees of due process and equal protection are co-extensive
with those of the United States Constitution. 7 The significance

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 212, 450 S.E.2d at 396.
Id. at 210, 450 S.E.2d at 395.
Henshaw v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 338, 451 S.E.2d 415 (1994).
In Tri-Pharmacy,Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court of Virginia stated:
In Hall v. Commonwealth, 138 Va. 727, 733, 121 S.E. 154, 155, we
expressed the view that the purpose of these statutes (then embodied in
Acts 1920, ch. 345, p. 516) was to protect and enforce the rights of the
citizens guaranteed to them by Article I, § 10 of the Virginia Constitution; and in Zimmerman v. Bedford, 134 Va. 787, 802, 115 S.E. 362, 366,
we said that their requirements were the same in substance as those
contained in the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
203 Va. 723, 728, 127 S.E.2d 89, 92 (1962) (footnote omitted).
Compare, however, that language to this discussion in Benderson Development
Co. v. Sciortino:
It is true that for a long period of our history, the Equal Protection clause was interpreted by both federal and state courts in language
that bore marked similarities to the analysis we made of statutes under
the special-laws prohibition contained in the Virginia Constitution. But
the two are not the same. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution, of which the Equal Protection clause is a part, was declared
ratified in 1868, during the period of Reconstruction. Its purpose was the
prevention of racial discrimination by state legislatures. Although it was,
in later years, extended to apply to other kinds of state legislation, the
Supreme Court of the United States has, based upon considerations of
federalism, been markedly deferential to state laws which make economic
classifications, when those laws have been challenged on Equal Protection
grounds. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977); New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co.,
410 U.S. 356 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). McGowan
v. Maryland, for instance, held that Maryland's Sunday-closing law would
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of the departure, however, is limited at least somewhat by the
fact that the court relied, in some cases indirectly, on federal
case law interpreting the federal guarantee of due process.98
Whether subsequent cases will rely on Henshaw as a source of
a new or
distinct basis for substantive guarantees remains to
99
be. seen.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia, following the teach0 held that
ings of Simmons v. South Carolina,"
it was a denial of due process not to inform a jury in a capital case that the
defendant, if sentenced to life in prison, was ineligible for pa10
role. 1

offend the Equal Protection clause "only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective."
366 U.S. 420, 425. On the other hand, federal equal-protection analysis
as applied to "suspect classifications," has become far more stringent than
analysis of economic legislation. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
By contrast, the special-laws prohibitions contained in the Virginia
Constitution are aimed squarely at economic favoritism, and have been so
since their inception.
236 Va. 136, 146, 372 S.E.2d 751, 756 (1988) (emphasis added).
98. Henshaw, 19 Va. App. at 344-45, 451 S.E.2d at 418-19 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973)).
99. Notwithstanding the holding in Henshaw that the trial judge erred in refusing
to permit the defendant an opportunity to view and photograph the crime scene, the
court held that the error was harmless under the circumstances of the case which
included an extensive opportunity to cross-examine the Commonwealth's witnesses
regarding the crime scene and photographs introduced by the Commonwealth. Id. at
347-48, 451 S.E.2d at 420-21. Similarly, in Johnson v. Commonwealth, the court of
appeals held that the trial judge erred in conditioning a proper severance of trials on
the defendant's agreement not to wear his military uniform, which the court held he
had a First Amendment right to do. 19 Va. App. 441, 163, 165 449 S.E.2d 819, 82021 (1994). Like in Henshaw, however, the error was held to be harmless. Id. at 166,
449 S.E.2d at 821.
100. Simmons v. South Carolina, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
101. Mickens v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 423, 457 S.E.2d 9 (1995). Compare
Mickens with Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 518, 450 S.E.2d 360 (1994) (coming
to an opposite conclusion where the defendant, at the time of his sentencing, did not
have the requisite three prior violent felony convictions in order to bar his eligibility
for parole).
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102

In Wild v. Commonwealth,' the court of appeals affirmed
a prisoner's conviction for inflicting bodily injury upon a correctional officer while an inmate of a state correctional facility in
violation of Va. Code section 18.2-55. Relying on United States
v. Halper,' Wild alleged that because he had been administratively punished for that conduct..5 the prosecution under
section 18.2-55 was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause."°
The court of appeals disagreed and held that the administrative
proceeding was not a judicial proceeding, and served to "maintain institutional order," both of which factors disqualified the
proceeding from being a punitive, judicial proceeding."' As
relevant to Wild's circumstance, the Double Jeopardy Clause
only afforded protection against multiple judicial proceedings
which are also punitive in nature.0 8
Whether an administrative sanction can be punishment is an
issue that has arisen in the context of DUI prosecutions for
offenses committed since January 1, 1995. Effective January 1,
1995, section 46.2-391.2 provides that persons for whom an
arrest warrant is issued by a magistrate for DUI shall have

102. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a guarantee
against double jeopardy. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Since the Fifth Amendment is so
frequently associated with the privilege against self-incrimination, double jeopardy is
discussed here as a distinct subject area.
103. 18 Va. App. 716, 446 S.E.2d 626 (1994).
104. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
105. "The Department of Corrections, after an adjustment committee hearing,
placed Wild in isolation for fifteen days and revoked ninety days of his previously
earned 'good time credit.'" Wild, 18 Va. App. at 717, 446 S.E.2d at 626-27 (1994).
106. Id. at 718, 446 S.E.2d at 627.
107. Id. at 719, 446 S.E.2d at 627.
108. The opinion in Wild did not recite the elements of the offense for which Wild
was administratively "adjust[ed]." Since the overruling of Grady v. Corbin, in order
for double jeopardy to apply, the defendant must allege that he has been prosecuted
for the same offense twice; merely being prosecuted twice for the same conduct raises
no double jeopardy bar. United States v. Dixon, 113 S.Ct. 2849 (1993), overruling
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
The court in Wild affirmed that "[t]he prohibition against double jeopardy affords three protections. '[It] protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." Wild,
18 Va. App. at 718, 446 S.E.2d at 627 (quoting Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165
(1977)).
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their privilege to operate a motor vehicle administratively suspended for seven days."° Several courts have considered the

109. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-391.2 (Repl. Vol. 1994). The statute provides as follows:
A. If a breath test is taken pursuant to § 18.2-268.2 or any similar
ordinance of any county, city or town and the results show a blood alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more by weight by volume or 0.08 grams
or more per 210 liters of breath, or the person refuses to submit to the
breath test in violation of § 18.2-268.3 or any similar local ordinance,
and upon issuance of a warrant by the magistrate for a violation of §
18.2-266 or § 18.2-268.3, or any similar local ordinance, the person's
license shall be suspended immediately for seven days or in the case of
(i) an unlicensed person, (ii) a person whose license is otherwise suspend-

ed or revoked, or (iii) a person whose driver's license is from a jurisdiction other than the Commonwealth, such person's privilege to operate a
motor vehicle in the Commonwealth shall be suspended immediately for
seven days.
A law-enforcement officer, acting on behalf of the Commonwealth,
shall serve a notice of suspension personally on the arrested person.
When notice is served, the arresting officer shall promptly take possession of any drivers license held by the person and issued by the Commonwealth and shall promptly deliver it to the magistrate. Any driver's
license taken into possession under this section shall be forwarded
promptly by the magistrate to the clerk of the general district court of
the jurisdiction in which the arrest was made together with the warrant
or warrants, the results of the breath test, if any, and the report required by subsection B. A copy of the notice of suspension shall be forwarded forthwith to both the general district court of the jurisdiction in
which the arrest was made and the Commissioner. Transmission of this
information may be made by electronic means.
The clerk shall promptly return the suspended license to the person at the expiration of the seven-day suspension. Whenever a suspended
license is to be returned under this section or § 46.2-391.4, the person
may elect to have the license returned in person at the clerk's office or
by mail to the address on the person's license or to such other address
as he may request.
B. Promptly after arrest and service of the notice of suspension,
the arresting officer shall forward to the magistrate a sworn report of
the arrest that shall include (i) information which adequately identifies
the person arrested and (ii) a statement setting forth the arresting
officer's grounds for belief that the person violated § 18.2-266 or a similar local ordinance or refused to submit to a breath test in violation of §
18.2-268.3 or a similar local ordinance. The report required by this subsection shall be submitted on forms supplied by the Supreme Court.
C. Any person whose license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle
has been suspended under subsection A may, during the period of the
suspension, request the general district court of the jurisdiction in which
the arrest was made to review that suspension. The court shall review
the suspension within the same time period as the court hears an appeal
from an order denying bail or fixing terms of bail or terms of recognizance, giving this matter precedence over all other matters on its docket.
If the person proves to the court by a preponderance of the evidence that
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question and concluded that prosecution for DUI does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, notwithstanding an administrative suspension of a defendant's operator's license." At
least one other general district court judge has held that the
administrative suspension of a driver's operator's license is
punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause."' Although Wild suggested that "maintenance of institutional order" is a goal separate and apart from punishment,
as that term is employed in the double jeopardy context, the
the arresting officer did not have probable cause for the arrest, or that
the magistrate did not have probable cause to issue the warrant, the
court shall rescind the suspension, and the clerk of the court shall forthwith (i) return the suspended license, if any, to the person unless the
license has been otherwise suspended or revoked, (ii) deliver to the person a notice that the suspension under § 46.2-391.2 has been rescinded
and (iii) forward to the Commissioner a copy of the notice that the suspension under § 46.2-391.2 has been rescinded. Otherwise, the court shall
affirm the suspension. If the person requesting the review fails to appear
without just cause, his right to review shall be waived.
The court's findings are without prejudice to the person contesting
the suspension or to any other potential party as to any proceedings,
civil or criminal, and shall not be evidence in any proceedings, civil or
criminal.
D. If a person whose license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle
is suspended under subsection A is convicted under § 18.2-266 or any
similar local ordinance during the seven-day suspension imposed by subsection A, and if the court decides to issue the person a restricted permit
under subsection E of § 18.2-271.1, such restricted permit shall not be
issued to the person before the expiration of the seven-day suspension
imposed under subsection AId.
110. Commonwealth v. Tench, No. CR95-429-OOM (Henrico Circuit Court March 22,
1995) (holding that administrative suspension is neither a prosecution nor punishment
within the meaning of double jeopardy). Letter from J.R. Zeplon, Judge, Ninth Judicial District, Commonwealth of Virginia, to Michael E. M. Ginty, Asst.
Commonwealth's Attorney (Mar. 16, 1993) (on file with the University of Richmond
Law Review).
111. Commonwealth v. Hess, No. T95-1367, T95-1368 (Orange County General
District Court April 7, 1995) (holding that administrative suspension operates as
double jeopardy bar to subsequent DUI prosecution). The argument that a subsequent
DUI prosecution is violative of the guarantee against double jeopardy is predicated on
a trilogy of recent U.S. Supreme Court cases which, in combination, suggest that a
nominally civil sanction, if intended to deter future malfeasance or exact a measure
of retribution for past malfeasance, can be punishment within the meaning of the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937,
(1994); Austin v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435 (1989). See also James L. Dam, Ninth Circuit Reaffirms 'Double Jeopardy'
Opinion, LAWYERS WEEKLY USA, June 19, 1995, at 1; David Reed, Law Puts DUI
Convictions In Jeopardy, RICHMoND TIMEs-DISPATCH, April 11, 1995, at B4.
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deference accorded to prison administrators in the maintenance
of those institutions arguably limits the applicability of Wild to
prisoners' double jeopardy claims."
Lastly, the Supreme Court of Virginia refused to find any
statutory or constitutional right of a defendant to an interlocutory appeal in order to raise a double jeopardy challenge to a
prosecution.'
The court expressly rejected the notion that
such a right ought to exist on account of the fact that the purpose of the Double Jeopardy Clause is to protect against the
expense and stigma which inures to an accused during a second
trial for the same offense."
VII. TRIALS
The timing of trials was an issue taken up on several occasions by the court of appeals. A trial judge did not abuse his
discretion in granting a prosecutor's request for a nolle prosequi
in order to evade the time limits for prosecution required by
the Virginia speedy trial statute."5 Similarly, the statutory
speedy trial time limits do not begin anew when a case is remanded from an appellate court to the trial court, and therefore, the defendant may not challenge the re-trial as tardy
under the speedy trial statute."'
The courts also had occasion to review the parameters of the
circuit courts' jurisdiction to hear certain matters. In Pope v.
Commonwealth,"7 the court of appeals held that in a prosecution for forgery". where the victim of the offense was the
defendant's brother, section 16.1-241(J)" requires that the
112. See Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (holding that prison regulations which impinge on prisoners' constitutional rights are valid if reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests, which is a less restrictive standard than that ordinarily applied to constitutional infringements).
113. West v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 241, 445 S.E.2d 159 (1995).
114. Id. at 242, 445 S.E.2d at 159-60.
115. Arnold v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 218, 443 S.E.2d 183 (1994).
116. Morgan v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 637, 453 S.E.2d 914 (1995).
117. 19 Va. App. 130, 449 S.E.2d 269 (1994).
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-172 (Repl. Vol. 1988). The court went to some pains to
note that this forgery section, unlike other forgery statutes in the Code of Virginia,
required proof that the forgery operated to the prejudice of another. Pope, 19 Va.
App. at 133, 449 S.E.2d at 270.
119. The court of appeals made the following observation regarding the jurisdiction
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defendant's preliminary hearing to determine probable cause be
held in the local juvenile and domestic relations court.' The
Attorney General argued that because the Commonwealth was
the "victim" in all criminal prosecutions, the prosecution need
not have begun in juvenile and domestic relations court and
could permissibly have begun, as it did, in the general district
court.'2' The court rejected that argument by noting that if
that were true, then the juvenile and domestic relations court
would never exercise jurisdiction pursuant to section 16.1-241(J)
which construction would render the statute a nullity. 122 In
Moreno v. Commonwealth,123 the Supreme Court of Virginia
held on habeas corpus review, that the Virginia courts did not
have jurisdiction to try the defendant because the defendant's
conduct, though it would be criminal if committed in Virginia,
took place entirely outside of Virginia. The defendant's conduct
of selling drugs to a person, who in turn distributed the drugs
in Virginia with the defendant's knowledge, did not have the
immediate result of a crime taking place in Virginia. 4
The past year also proved that selecting a jury panel is a
process filled with traps for the unwary and ripe for appellate
review. In Commonwealth v. DeHart,121 the court of appeals
en banc, affirmed a panel decision holding that a trial judge
who improperly failed to strike a juror for cause committed

of the juvenile and domestic relations courts:
By statute, the juvenile and domestic relations district courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction in the following matters:
All offenses in which one family or household member is
charged with an offense in which another family or household member
is the victim. In prosecution for felonies over which the court has
jurisdiction, jurisdiction shall be limited to determining whether or not
there is probable cause. For purposes of this subsection, "family or
household member," as defined in § 16.1-228, shall also be construed
to include parent and child, stepparent and stepchild, brothers and
sisters, and grandparent and grandchild, regardless of whether such
persons reside in the same home.
Pope, 19 Va. App. at 132, 449 S.E.2d at 270 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(J)
(Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1995)).
120. Id. at 133-34, 449 S.E.2d at 270-71.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 249 Va. 16, 452 S.E.2d 653 (1995).
124. Id. at 18-20, 452 S.E.2d at 655.
125. 20 Va. App. 213, 456 S.E.2d 133 (1995) (en banc), affg, 19 Va. App. 139, 449
S.E.2d 59 (1994).
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reversible error notwithstanding the fact that the
Commonwealth's Attorney later exercised one of his peremptory
strikes to remove the juror. The decision rested on the notion
that a defendant is entitled to a venire of potential jurors who
can sit impartially in the matter at hand, and the presence of
one juror who cannot serve impartially deprives the defendant
of his full complement of unbiased jurors regardless of which
jurors are struck by whom. 6 In Griffin v. Commonwealth,'
a juror stated during voir dire that he believed the defendant
in a criminal trial bore the burden of proving his innocence.
The juror, later in voir dire, stated that he had "misspoke[n]" in
his earlier statement and that "I believe that people ... have

to be proven guilty, not that they are guilty when they are
charged. I think that's the answer to your question."'2 The
court of appeals held that the juror's later statements were a
result of leading questions by the trial judge and the prosecutor
which "taint[ed] the reliability of the juror's [later]
responses."" The court therefore refused to defer to the trial
judge's fact finding that the juror properly understood the burden of proof."
In Buck v. Commonwealth,'' the Supreme Court of Virginia
added to the long line of cases interpreting the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Batson v. Kentucky. 2 and considered the
proper allocation of the burden of proof in challenging a
prosecutor's race-neutral reasons for striking a juror as
pretextual. The court held that the party challenging an allegedly race-based strike has the burden of showing that the explanation is simply a pretext for a race-based strike; that burden is not one the trial court must take up "in the absence of
defense counsel's identification of a false or pretextual reason
for the peremptory strikes."'
126. Id. at 213-14, 456 S.E.2d at 134.
127. 19 Va. App. 619, 454 S.E.2d 363 (1995).
128. Id. at 624, 454 S.E.2d at 365.
129. Id. at 625, 454 S.E.2d at 366 (quoting McGill v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App.
237, 242, 391 S.E.2d 597, 600 (1990)).
130. Id. at 626, 454 S.E.2d at 367.
131. 247 Va. 449, 443 S.E.2d 414 (1994).
132. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
133. Buck, 247 Va. at 453, 443 S.E.2d at 416. The court held that Buck's challenges to the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations as pretextual, which on appeal were
detailed in their factual basis, were not sufficiently articulated by trial counsel's
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In James v. Commonwealth,"3 handed down the same day
as Buck, the Supreme Court of Virginia also held that a prosecutor permissibly exercised a peremptory strike on a venireman
"perceived to be sympathetic to persons facing possible incarceration," which perception was based on the venireman's "employment and visible display of a religious symbol."' Justice
Hassell dissented from the court's opinion in part on the
ground that the "Supreme Court of Virginia ought not condone
religious discrimination practiced in the courts of this Commonwealth, particularly in light of Virginia's historical role in the
development of the constitutional right of free exercise of religion."3 6 Only one month later, the majority's position may
have found some slight support from the U.S. Supreme Court
in Davis v. Minnesota,3 v when the Court refused to hear a
case involving a religion-based exercise of a peremptory strike.'
statement: "My concern was that the jurors are not representative of the population.
There were three blacks on the panel. We now only have one, and I would think
more significant reasons than what was given should be shown." Therefore Buck's
arguments regarding the inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the prosecutor's race-neutral explanations were procedurally barred. See also James v. Commonwealth, 247 Va.
459, 442 S.E.2d 396 (1994):
The importance of meaningful review of proffers made by both the
defendant and the prosecution at each step of a Batson challenge cannot
be [over]stated. Nevertheless, often the actual sequence of events at trial
merges the separate procedural steps as well as the determinations required of a court.
Consolidation of various steps does not invalidate the process as
long as the consolidation does not adversely impact the rights of any
party.
Id. at 462, 442 S.E.2d at 398; see also Simpson v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 174,
455 S.E.2d 749 (1995) (holding that an all-white venire does not deprive an African
American defendant of equal protection rights).
134. 247 Va. 459, 442 S.E.2d 396 (1994).
135. Id. at 461, 442 S.E.2d at 398.
136. Id. at 464, 442 S.E.2d at 399-400 (Hassell, J., dissenting). Justice Hassell was
the sole dissenter in both James and Buck. See Buck, 247 Va. at 454, 443 S.E.2d at
417 (Hassell, J., dissenting).
137. 114 S. Ct. 2120 (1994).
138. Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the denial of certiorari, noted the Minnesota
Supreme Court's observation that "[o]rdinarily . . . inquiry on voir dire into a juror's
religious affiliation and beliefs is irrelevant and prejudicial, and to ask such questions
is improper." Id. at 2120. Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, argued that the
Supreme Court's recent extension of the Batson protections to gender-based discrimination in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994) compelled a grant of
certiorari in order for the Supreme Court to consider the application of Batson to
religious-based peremptory strikes. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2120. The denial of certiorari
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Perhaps the most significant long-range development in the
conduct of criminal trials in Virginia is the introduction of bifurcated trials to all jury trials in all felony cases.139 Beginning in July of last year, jury trials in felony cases will
have
two phases-one for determination of guilt or innocence and
another for setting punishment.' ° In felony cases, the
defendant's entire criminal record is admissible, so long as the
Commonwealth can provide to the jury properly certified copies
of conviction orders.'
As a condition of the admissibility of
the conviction orders, the Commonwealth must provide to the
defense certified copies of the orders fourteen days prior to
trial. The bifurcated system has long been employed in capital cases,'
and its introduction into general criminal practice 4 is consistent with Virginia's new truth-in-sentencing
scheme.' The risks now associated with a jury trial are of
course heightened for defendants with significant criminal
records.
Whether a trial judge is bound to set aside a jury verdict on
.the defendant's claim that evidence discovered after trial would
have proved significant to the trial also proved to be a bone of
some contention, and one largely resolved on a fact-specific
basis. In Kirby v. Commonwealth,' the defendant successfully
moved to set aside his conviction on the ground that the defense only learned after trial that the police informant used to

in Davis should not be read to foreclose future U.S. Supreme Court challenges to religion-based strikes, as the Court has frequently warned against inferring too much
from a denial of certiorari. "The denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of
opinion upon the merits of the case, as the bar has been told many times." United
States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482, 490 (1923).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. The Code of Virginia permits the Commonwealth to prove prior traffic offenses in jury trials by submitting a copy of the defendant's prior traffic record. VA.
CODE ANN. § 46.2-943 (Repl. Vol. 1994). Whether that system comports with the
Sixth Amendment has yet to be explicitly decided. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Griswold case and its requirement that prior convictions
offered to enhance punishment must first be shown to have been counseled or that
the defendant freely and voluntarily waived counsel).
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
144. Note that there is no bifurcated trial system for misdemeanor criminal trials.
145. See infra notes 219-233 and accompanying text (discussing abolition of parole
and truth-in-sentencing).
146. 19 Va. App. 332, 451 S.E.2d 53 (1994).
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secure the defendant's conviction had previously been implicated in fabricating evidence in other cases.
Kirby came on the heels of the court of appeals panel decision in Hopkins v. Commonwealth,47 which resulted in a remand for a new trial based on after-discovered evidence that
another person had committed the murder for which the defendant had been convicted. On a rehearing en banc, however, the
court of appeals affirmed the trial judge's ruling that the new
evidence was in the form of testimony so riddled with inconsistencies and previous deceit that it was incredible and such that
it would not have the effect of an opposite result on retrial.'
The court affirmed the trial judge's finding of "incredibility,"
notwithstanding the fact that the witnesses implicating the
third party were blood relations in some cases to the third
party, in another case to the victim, and included the third
party himself." The en banc majority emphasized, however,
that the confessing third party had given a prior, sworn, contradictory statement and that the testimony of the other afterdiscovered witnesses was inconsistent at best." ° The panel
majority had held that those sorts of credibility determinations
were for a jury to resolve; the en banc majority held that the
trial judge properly made the finding as part of his review to
ascertain whether an opposite result would be obtained if the
matter were retried with the after-discovered evidence includ5
1

ed.'

VIII. CRIMES

Both the courts and the General Assembly made significant
contributions to defining what amounts to crime this past year.

147.
S.E.2d
148.
149.
150.
151.

19 Va. App. 1, 448 S.E.2d
147 (1995).
Hopkins v. Commonwealth,
Hopkins, 19 Va. App. at 7,
Hopkins, 20 Va. at 249-50,
Id.

316, (1994), rev'd en banc, 20 Va. App. 242, 456
20 Va. App. 242, 456 S.E.2d 147 (1995).
448 S.E.2d at 319.
456 S.E.2d at 150-51.
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A. Driving Under the Influence..2
Beginning January 1, 1995, the legislature sealed one avenue
of attack in DUI cases by ending the scheme whereby a DUI
defendant was entitled to his choice of a blood or breath test to
determine his blood alcohol content under the implied consent
law.'53 Absent some extenuating circumstance, DUI defendants
are now required to take a breath test to determine their blood
alcohol content." As noted above, defendants arrested for
DUI will find that their operators' licenses have been administratively suspended for seven days.'55 Whether that suspension is punishment within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy
Clause, and therefore bars a subsequent prosecution for DUI,
has been hotly debated but has not yet been decided by the
court of appeals.'56 Also new this year, drivers under the age
of twenty-one are subject to a zero-tolerance law; a blood alcohol content of 0.02 or higher earns the underage defendant a
suspended license for one year. 7 As of July 1, 1994, a person
with a blood alcohol content of 0.08 or higher is presumed to be
driving impaired.'
M

In a prosecution for felony driving as a habitual offender,
which requires proof, in a first offense, that the defendant
drove in a manner so as to endanger life, limb, or property of

152. See, VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1995).
153. Id. § 18.2-268.2 (Cur. Supp. 1995). See Breeden v. Commonwealth, 15 Va.
App. 148, 421 S.E.2d 674 (1992) (reversing a conviction where the Commonwealth

failed to prove that a blood test was "unavailable" within the meaning of the statute,
and consequently depriving the defendant of an opportunity to acquire evidence which
might exculpate him). In Artis v. City of Suffolk, for example, the defendant drunk
driver prevailed on appeal on account of the failure of the arresting officer to give a
form listing independent blood testing laboratories to the defendant instead of merely
showing the form to him. 19 Va. App. 168, 450 S.E.2d 165 (1994). Defendants who
are now without the option to elect to take a blood test are thereby deprived of the
incidental benefits of being able to attack the allegedly improper administration of
the blood test.
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-268.2 (Curn. Supp. 1995).
155. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 110-111 and accompanying text (discussing potential double
jeopardy implications for administrative suspension of operator's license statute).
157. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266.1 (Cum. Supp. 1995).
158. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (Cur. Supp. 1995), repealing VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-266 (Repl. Vol. 1988). The old statute did not give rise to such a presumption
until the defendant had a blood alcohol content of 0.10 or higher.
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another; 59 proof that the defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol is insufficient by itself to prove the requisite
endangerment. 6 ' Proof of the DUI does not give rise to a presumption6 of endangerment; actual endangerment is
required.'

1

B. Larceny, Burglary and Robbery
In Johnson v. Commonwealth,'62 the court of appeals construed Virginia Code section 18.2-92, breaking and entering of a
dwelling house while occupied, to permit a conviction even
though the dwelling is not in fact occupied by anyone at the
time of the breaking and entering. The dissent pointed out that
other burglary statutes, which do not include the limiting
phrase "occupied," permit conviction for breaking and entering
of a dwelling house, meaning a place where humans live and
sleep, without also requiring proof that the building actually
contain people when broken into." Therefore, argued the dissent, "occupied" in section 18.2-92 must mean more than simply
a place where humans sleep.'6
In a case of first impression, the court of appeals similarly
construed the statute barring larceny from the person." The
appellant contended that larceny from the person must require
proof that the object stolen from the victim be actually on the
victim's person.'66 The court of appeals disagreed and held
that "from the person" means only from the victim's "possession
and immediate presence." 7 The dissent argued that the common law offense of robbery barred a forcible larceny "from the
person" and "from the person's presence" but that the common
law understood those phrases to have distinct meanings unto

159. VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-357(B)(1) (Repl. Vol. 1994 & Cum. Supp. 1995).
160. Bishop v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 206, 210, 455 S.E.2d 765, 766 (1995).
161. Id. at 212, 455 S.E.2d at 767.
162. 18 Va. 441, 444 S.E.2d 559 (1994) (construing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-92 (Repl.
Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1995)).
163. Id. at 449-50, 444 S.E.2d at 564 (Benton, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 450-51, 444 S.E.2d at 564 (Benton, J., dissenting).
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-96(1) (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cum. Supp. 1995).
166. Garland v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 706, 708, 446 S.E.2d 628, 629 (1994).
167. Id. at 710, 446 S.E.2d at 630.
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themselves.168 According to the dissent, by construing "from
the person," as that phrase is employed in section 18.2-95, to
have the common law meaning of both "from the person," and
"from the person's presence," the majority ignored the rule of
statutory construction that penal statutes ought to be strictly
construed against the Commonwealth.'6 9
In Bryant v. Commonwealth,'70 the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Commonwealth had proved a trespass
against the store's constructive possession, by showing that the
defendant removed tags and packaging from a product for sale
in a store, and therefore, asportation sufficient to prove a
larceny. In Walls v. Commonwealth, 7' the supreme court reversed a conviction for grand larceny' 72 on the grounds that
an employee of a corporation cannot give his opinion as to the
value of property stolen from a corporation unless his opinion is
somehow related to his employment; the employee's opinion
based on his "personal experience" is insufficient to prove the
value of stolen property.
The court of appeals considered two cases dealing with the
required proof of intimidation or force in a robbery case. In
Bivins v. Commonwealth,7 3 the defendant's sudden movement
in taking a cash register drawer from in front of a store clerk,
though it scared the clerk, was not an overt expression of a
present intention to use force or violence against the victim. By
contrast, in Beard v. Commonwealth," the defendant had
property, which was not his own, in his hand, and was confronted by a person who challenged his authority to keep the
property. The defendant then used physical force to push the
confronting person away. 7 5 Because "no absolute severance of
the property from [the victim's] possession had occurred" when
the violence was employed by the defendant, the evidence was
sufficient to prove a robbery. 6
168. Id. at 711, 446 S.E.2d at 631 (Benton, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Benton, J., dissenting).
170. 248 Va. 179, 445 S.E.2d 667 (1994).
171. 248 Va. 480, 450 S.E.2d 363 (1994).
172. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-95 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cure. Supp. 1995) (requiring
proof that the stolen property was valued in excess of $200).
173. 19 Va. App. 750, 454 S.E.2d 741 (1995).
174. 19 Va. App. 359, 451 S.E.2d 698 (1994).
175. Id. at 361, 451 S.E.2d at 699.
176. Id. at 365, 451 S.E.2d at 700-01. Note that this case also held that the
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C. Drugs
77 the court again undertook
In Scruggs v. Commonwealth,'
to examine what constitutes "constructive possession." The defendant was driving his own car, and the passenger was seated
on a shirt, underneath of which were both a set of keys belonging to the passenger and contraband, (both items were in a slit
in the car seat). 78 The court concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that the defendant knew the contraband to
be in the car and intended to exercise dominion and control
over it. 79 In another drug case, the court permitted evidence
that a trained dog "alerted" to money indicating that the money
had traces of cocaine on it which was linked to the defendant
and found in close proximity to contraband. ° The court did
not reach the question of whether such evidence is probative in
light of the large quantity of U.S. currency, which bears trace
amounts of drugs because
that question was not adequately
8
raised in the trial court.' '
82 the court of appeals again
In Hudak v. Commonwealth,'
affirmed that a successful prosecution for conspiracy is a difficult task. Over a twelve month period, Hudak engaged in four
transactions with another person resulting in sales of between
200 and 2000 "hits" of LSD from Hudak to another person."
In the absence of proof regarding the other person's habits of
consumption of LSD or expert testimony regarding the potency
of an LSD "hit" or how long LSD can be stored, the jury had no
evidence on which to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
Hudak knew, or should have known, his buyer intended to redistribute the LSD.' Therefore, the evidence was insufficient

victim's co-worker had a superior right to custody of the stolen property than the
defendant, and therefore force used against the co-worker was sufficient to prove
robbery. Id.
177. 19 Va. App. 58, 448 S.E.2d 663 (1994).
178. Id. at 60, 448 S.E.2d at 664.
179. Id. at 52-65, 448 S.E.2d at 665.
180. Hetmeyer v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 103, 448 S.E.2d 894 (1994).
181. Id.
182. 19 Va. App. 260, 450 S.E.2d 769 (1994).
183. Id. at 261, 450 S.E.2d at 770.
184. Id. at 262-64, 450 S.E.2d at 771.
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to prove
1 a conspiracy to distribute LSD between Hudak and his
85

buyer.

D. Murder
In Berkeley v. Commonwealth,8 ' the confusing subject of
felony-murder was taken up by the court of appeals. The court
held that if a death takes place during the commission of a
felony and the death is so closely related in time, place, and
causal connection to the felony as to make it part of the same
criminal enterprise, then the death-even though it might have
been committed by another-and the requisite malice to prove
murder may be imputed to the defendant. 8 ' This holding
seems to conflict with an earlier holding by the Supreme Court
of Virginia that the mere fact that the felony is the proximate
cause of the death is insufficient to impute malice to the defendant on a felony-murder theory." Rather in Wooden v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that felonymurder only applies if the killing was "'actually or constructively committed" by the defendant felon "'or someone
acting in concert with him or in furtherance of a common design or purpose. '"" The Commonwealths Attorney in Berkeley
specifically disavowed a "concert-of-action" theory of the
defendant's criminal liability for the death.' °
E. Miscellaneous
Relying on Yarborough v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals held in Sprouse v. Commonwealth9 that a defendant
who employed a toy gun in a robbery did not use a firearm in
the commission of a robbery in violation of Virginia Code sec-

185. Id.
186. 19 Va. App. 279, 451 S.E.2d 41 (1994).
187. Id. at 287, 451 S.E.2d at 45 (1994).
188. Wooden v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 758, 284 S.E.2d 811 (1981).
189. Berkeley, 19 Va. App. at 291, 451 S.E.2d at 47 (Benton, J., dissenting) (quoting John S. Anooshian, Note, Should Courts Use Principles of Justification and Excuse to Impose Felony-Murder Liability?, 19 RuTGERS L.J. 451, 461-62 (1988)).
190. Id. at 287, 451 S.E.2d at 45 (Benton, J., dissenting).
191. 247 Va. 215, 441 S.E.2d 342 (1994).
192. 19 Va. App. 548, 453 S.E.2d 303 (1995).
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tion 18.2-53.1. This holding, though it followed from
Yarborough's command that proof in a section 18.2-53.1 case requires proof that the defendant actually used a firearm9 3 is
at least somewhat at odds with earlier case law, which stated
that section 18.2-53.1 was designed to protect not only against
the real danger of using a firearm in certain felonies, but
against the fear engendered in victims confronted by what they
believed to be a firearm.'
The court of appeals concluded
95
departure from prior law.
a
represented
that Yarborough
IX. EVIDENCE 9 '
A. PriorBad Acts
Among the issues engaged by the courts this year, perhaps
none was more frequently discussed than the law of prior bad
acts. The general rule is that evidence of prior, uncharged misconduct by the defendant is inadmissible against him in a criminal trial.'9 7 Application of that rule, however, is complicated
by the numerous exceptions to it.
In Jennings v. Commonwealth,9 ' the court of appeals affirmed a trial judge's decision to permit, in a prosecution for
abduction with intent to defile and sodomy of a child, evidence
that the defendant had previously befriended and sodomized
four other teenage boys. The majority held that the "other
crimes" evidence was probative of the defendant's intent at the
time of the abduction.'9 9 Judge Barrow, in dissent, observed
that if sodomy is a crime so likely to be repeated that evidence

193. Id. at 551-52, 453 S.E.2d at 305.
194. See Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 198, 269 S.E.2d 356, 358
(1980).
195. Sprouse, 19 Va. App. at 551, 453 S.E.2d at 306. Cf. Wilson v. Commonwealth,
No. 0069-94-1, 1995 WL 332198 (Va. App. June 6, 1995) (affirming a § 18.2-53.1 conviction where no gun was ever recovered from the defendant, but where the victim
described what appeared to be a gun and the jury permissibly inferred it was a gun).
196. In this section, I attempt to draw the reader's attention to cases dealing with
some of the evidentiary concerns frequently encountered in, if not peculiar to,
criminal practice, and therefore, some cases treating general evidentiary matters (e.g,
application of the hearsay rule) are not highlighted here.
197. See Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269, 176 S.E.2d 802 (1970).
198. 20 Va. App. 9, 454 S.E.2d 752 (1995).
199. Id. at 18, 454 S.E.2d at 756.
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of a prior sodomy results in little or no prejudice, then the
legislature, rather than the courts, ought to fashion a rule of
evidence consistent with that notion. °
Where the Commonwealth is required to prove a prior conviction in order to subject the defendant to a statutorily enhanced
punishment, the Commonwealth may introduce as many prior
convictions as it sees fit, during the guilt phase of the trial,
regardless of what number of predicate convictions the enhancement statute requires (e.g. "second or subsequent conviction").20 ' The court of appeals reasoned that this must be so
because "the Commonwealth could not know which, if either, of
the prior ...
convictions the jury might accept or might be
challenged [and therefore], 'it was entitled to utilize its entire
arsenal' to satisfy the requirements of [the statute]." 0 2 As a
practical matter, the chance that some conviction orders might
be disbelieved by a jury is slim indeed. A typical order is plain
enough on its face and not readily susceptible to attack, and
one properly certified order is not generally any more credible
than another.
By contrast, in Long v. Commonwealth,..3 the court of appeals held that a defendant charged with more than one crime,
only one of which required proof of a prior conviction during
the guilt phase of the trial, was entitled to have that charge
severed from the remaining charges. The court reasoned that
the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia vested in the trial
court only limited discretion to try separate offenses together,
even though arising out of the same transaction.2 That discretion is limited, in part, by the requirement that the offenses
be tried together only if justice 'does not require separate tri-

200. Id. at 20, 454 S.E.2d at 757 (Barrow, J., dissenting). In Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia similarly concluded that evidence of the
defendant's prior drug sales was part of the defendant's general scheme of selling
drugs and was intimately connected and blended with the charged offense, and therefore, was properly admitted against the defendant. 249 Va. 203, 454 S.E.2d 725
(1995).
201. Dotson v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 465, 445 S.E.2d 492 (1994).
202. Id. at 468, 445 S.E.2d at 494 (quoting Pittman v. Commonwealth, 17 Va.
App. 33, 36, 434 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1993)).
203. 20 Va. App. 223, 456 S.E.2d 138 (1995).
204. Id. at 226, 456 S.E.2d at 139 (interpreting VA. SUP. CT. R. 3Az6(b)).
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that justice required separate
one offense requires proof of a
which "is suggestive of the
and tends to adversely affect

B. Expert Testimony
In Price v. Commonwealth, °7 the court of appeals affirmed
that an expert's testimony is admissible if, inter alia, it is
based on the expert's own personal knowledge, facts disclosed
in his own testimony, or facts in evidence assumed in a hypothetical question. In Rodriguez v. Commonwealth,"8 however,
the court affirmed a trial judge's refusal to permit expert testimony regarding the fallibility of eyewitness identifications.
Rodriguez proffered that his expert, if allowed to testify, would
have opined that such identifications are unreliable for a
variety of reasons."°a The court held that whether to admit
expert testimony concerning eyewitness identification is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and that "men
of ordinary intelligence' are capable of understanding the inher205. Id.
206. Id. at 227, 456 S.E.2d at 139. While still a sitting judge of the Fairfax Circuit Court, Judge Rosemarie Annunziata authored an opinion interpreting Va. Code §
19.2-261, which permits the Commonwealth, under certain circumstances, to join defendants together in a single trial if they are charged with crimes arising out of related acts or occurrences. Commonwealth v. Kruger, 33 Va. Cir. 369 (Fairfax County
1994). The opinion held that a defendant was entitled to a separate trial when a codefendant proffered that he would provide exculpatory evidence through his own testimony at the defendant's trial if the two cases were severed. Id. at 372.
207. 18 Va. App. 760, 446 S.E.2d 642 (1994).
208. 20 Va. App. 122, 455 S.E.2d 724 (1995).
209. Specifically, Rodriguez proffered that the expert would have testified that:
(1) the subjects in photo arrays and live lineups should match the description of the culprit, not the suspect; (2) police fillers should not be
used in lineups because they are more confident and homogeneous; (3)
anything in a lineup or photo array that makes the suspect stand out as
distinctive should be eliminated; (4) a positive lineup identification following a photo array is partially the result of the witness's memory of the
photos; (5) a witness will rarely make a different decision in a subsequent identification; (6) misidentification is especially prevalent when
stress, poor lighting, or a long delay between the crime and the identification is present; and (7) no correlation exists between an eyewitness's
confidence and the accuracy of his identification.
Id. at 124-25, 455 S.E.2d at 725-26.
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ent problems with lineup identifications and eyewitness testimony. 2' o
One might be forgiven for not knowing that "police fillers
should not be used in lineups because they are more confident."
The trial judge in Rodriguez found, however, that such knowledge is "common sense... simply something everybody
knows."21' Moreover, the expert's proffered testimony that
there is no link between the accuracy of an identification and
the witness's certainty of the identification is not only contrary
to what many "men of ordinary intelligence" might believe, but
is in fact contrary to what the U.S. Supreme Court and Virginia courts have long held. 2' The resolution of just this sort of
inquiry-whether witnesses who are certain of their identification are more or less likely to be accurate-is precisely the sort
of scientific conclusion expert testimony was designed to
aid.2 3 The court of appeals in Rodriguez did allow that a dif-

210. Id. at 128, 455 S.E.2d at 728; see also Commonwealth v. Lemos, 34 Va. Cir.
312, 315 (Fairfax County 1994) (holding that the eyewitness identification expert who
the defendant sought to be court-appointed would have "seriously undermine[d] the
traditional function of the jury in this Commonwealth [by eroding the jury's determination of credibility questions]").
211. Rodriguez, 20 Va. App. at 125, 455 S.E.2d at 726.
212. In Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114-16 (1977) and in Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized that reviewing
courts ought to examine the totality of the circumstances, and more specifically several identifiable factors, in determining the reliability of a witness' identification, notwithstanding any suggestive identification procedure. These factors are:
[1] [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime, [2] the witness' degree of attention, [3] the accuracy of the
witness' prior description of the criminal, [4] the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and [5] the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation.
Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200 (emphasis addea); see also Hill v. Commonwealth, 2 Va.
App. 683, 693, 347 S.E.2d 913, 918 (1986) (applying the same standard).
213. The court in Rodriguez began its discussion of the admissibility of expert
opinion with this statement of the law:
In Virginia, expert opinions are admissible only if
"the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to
prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for the reason that
the subject matter so far partakes of the nature of a science, art or trade
as to require a previous habit of experience or study in it to acquire a
knowledge thereof."
Rodriguez, 20 Va. App. at 126, 455 S.E.2d at 726 (quoting Hubbard v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 250, 254, 403 S.E.2d 708, 710 (1991)). How many jurors can
claim any experience with ascertaining the validity of lineup identifications? If the
proffered testimony is contrary to even the U.S. Supreme Court's assessment of what
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ferent result might be obtained if some special circumstance regarding the identification were at issue, such as such as crossracial identification or identification after observation under
stress.214
Finally, in several cases, the court of appeals undertook to
construe the parameters of Virginia Code section 19.2-187,
which permits a properly attested certificate of analysis to state
in writing the results of a scientific analysis or examination.
Practitioners are likely to see such certificates with extraordinary frequency in drug cases, where the certificate proves that
the substance analyzed is in fact contraband, and in DUI cases,
where the certificate is used to prove the defendant's blood
alcohol content. The court of appeals held that such certificates
are not admissible for purposes of conveying an expert's opinion.215 Nor is the certificate admissible if defense counsel asks
the Commonwealth's Attorney for a copy of the certificate and
has not received it seven days prior to trial.21 Finally, a certificate that is simply signed by some official, but which does
not contain the attestation clause required by the statute, is
inadmissible.21 A photocopy of the certificate is, however, admissible. '

makes an identification valid, how can a typical juror be expected to know the
expert's position as a matter of common knowledge?
214. Rodriguez, 20 Va. App. at 129, 455 S.E.2d at 728.
215. Barber v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 497, 452 S.E.2d 873 (1995).
216. Copeland v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 515, 452 S.E.2d 876 (1995).
217. Frere v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 460, 452 S.E.2d 682 (1995).
218. Id. at 466-67, 452 S.E.2d at 686-87 (applying the best evidence rule). Cf.
Untiedt v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 836, 447 S.E.2d 537 (1994) (construing Va.
Code § 46.2-882, which provided that only a "true copy" of a certificate establishing
the accuracy of tuning forks used to calibrate a radar speed detector was admissible
at trial to prove the accuracy of the radar device). The court concluded that "true
copy" is a term of art which is defined in Virginia Code § 8.01-391(B) and requires
that the attestation "aver that the [authenticating official] certify that [he or she]
does in fact have [or had] the custody [of the original]." Id. at 838, 447 S.E.2d at
538. The court held that § 8.01-391(B) defining "true copy" and § 46.2-882 using the
phrase "true copy" must be construed in a consistent manner. Id. Practitioners would
do well to note that this sophisticated argument, which required a thorough appreciation of disparate titles in the code, was successfully urged by a defendant who appeared pro se.
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SENTENCING AND OTHER REMEDIES

In Bailey v. Commonwealth," the court of appeals reversed
a trial court's revocation of a defendant's suspended sentence
when the defendant contended that evidence of drug use in a
drug test was attributable to his use prior to receiving his suspended sentence. The court held that because uncontroverted
testimony proved that Bailey had consumed cocaine only five
days prior to the test which resulted in the trial judge revoking
the suspended time (which consumption was also prior to the
imposition of the suspended sentence)... and because no evidence proved the likely duration of cocaine in a person's body,
the trial judge had no basis for concluding that Bailey's positive
test for cocaine was attributable to post-sentence consumption221

The decision in Bailey stands in marked contrast to the typically lenient view taken by the courts towards probation and
suspended sentence revocation proceedings. The court of appeals
in Carbaugh v. Commonwealth2 1 specifically construed Virginia Code section 19.2-306 to permit revocation of the defendant's
suspended sentence during either the "period of probation" or
"period of suspension [of sentence]." The court so concluded,
notwithstanding an apparent inconsistency in the statute which
appeared to permit revocation only during a period of probation,
if such probation was imposed.2
The most significant development in this area, however, is
unquestionably the abolition of parole and concomitant establishment of truth-in-sentencing. For felony offenses committed
after January 1, 1995, the defendant is ineligible for parole.2
This is true regardless of whether the defendant is sentenced to
a term of years, months, or days. Felons may continue to earn
good-time credits while incarcerated, but must in any event

219. 19 Va. App. 355, 451 S.E.2d 686 (1994).
220. Id. at 357-58, 451 S.E.2d at 687.
221. Id.
222. 19 Va. App. 119, 449 S.E.2d 264 (1994).
223. Id. at 123-25, 449 S.E.2d at 267-68.
224. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1 (Repl. Vol. 1994). Although there is no state-wide
provision for parole for misdemeanants, the new statute does not affect the manner
in which misdemeanants may earn good-time credits in local jails.
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serve eighty-five percent of their sentence." 5 This system of
good-time credit is a substantial departure from the past practice where some non-violent inmates could earn as much as a
day of good-time credit for each day served."' Note that the
abolition of parole applies only to felonies committed after January 1, 1995; felons who committed offenses prior to that date
remain eligible for parole and good conduct credit for those
offenses at the same rate as provided under the old system. 7
Though it abolished parole with one hand, the legislature
responsibly undertook to modify the existing sentencing guidelines with the other.22 The guidelines, established by the legislature for 1995, and in the future by the newly created Virginia Sentencing Commission,2 29 are based not on the sentences historically imposed, but on sentences historically served.3 °

225. Id. § 53.1-202.3.
226. See id. § 53.1-201.
227. VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-165.1.
228. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-232 to -238 (Cum. Supp. 1995); Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission, Virginia Sentencing Guidelines Effective January 1, 1995 (1995).
229. Code § 17-234(A) provides that the Commission shall consist of 17 members,
seven of whom are appointed by the Chief Justice of the Virginia Supreme Court
(including six sitting judges or justices and the chair of the Commission who cannot
be an active member of the judiciary), three appointed by the Speaker of the House
of Delegates, two appointed by the Senate Committee on Privileges and Elections,
and four appointed by the Governor. The Attorney General serves by virtue of his
office. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-234(A) (Cum. Supp. 1995); Virginia Sentencing Guidelines
at 3.
The current members of the Commission are: Chairman Earnest P. Gates, Retired Judge of the 12th Judicial Circuit; Judge F. Bruce Bach of the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit; Robert Bobb, City Manager for Richmond, Virginia; Jo Ann Bruce, Crime
Victims Advocate, Ashland, Virginia; Richard Cullen, Attorney, McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe; Peter Decker, Jr., Attorney, Decker, Cardon & Thomas; Hon. James
Gilmore, III, Attorney General; Frank Ferguson, Counselor to the Attorney General,
Attorney General Representative; William H. Fuller, III, Commonwealth's Attorney,
City of Danville; Judge George E. Honts, III, Twenty-Fifth Judicial Circuit; Judge J.
Samuel Johnston, Twenty-Fourth Judicial Circuit; H. Lane Kneedler, Attorney, Hazel
& Thomas; Judge Donald McGlothlin, Jr., Twenty-Ninth Judicial Circuit; Judge William Newman, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit; Rev. George F. Ricketts, Sr., Executive
Director, Chaplain Service of the Churches of Virginia, Inc.; Judge Robert W. Stewart,
Fourth Judicial Circuit; B. Norris Vassar, Senior Counsel/Legislative Director to Congressman Bobby Scott; Vivian E. Watts, Executive Director, Fairfax, Court Appointed
Advocate Program. Virginia Sentencing Guidelines at iii.
230. Virginia Sentencing Guidelines at 4. This methodology has resulted in the
somewhat surprising result that the sentences called for in the guidelines are frequently substantially lower than those previously handed down. Id. Of course, the
difference is that felons under the new guidelines will now serve nearly all of their
sentences.
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The guidelines do, however, call for substantial, and artificial
increases in guideline sentences for certain categories of felons,
in particular those with violent criminal histories.23 ' The new
guidelines also represent a fundamental departure from past
practices because a trial judge may depart from the guidelines
only for reasons specifically stated in writing. 2 Note, however, that the trial judge's failure to comply with the sentencing
guidelines is a matter the legislature has specifically stated
shall not be a basis for a challenge on appeal. 3
XI. APPEALS
That the Commonwealth can appeal from an adverse ruling
by a circuit court which turned on certain constitutional provisions, but a criminal defendant cannot, does not violate the
defendant's Equal Protection rights.2" As noted above, a criminal defendant
has no right at all to an interlocutory ap5
peal

.2

Beginning with Notices of Appeal filed in circuit courts on
July 1, 1994, the court of appeals began adhering to a policy for
which it already had statutory authority but which it had not
previously employed.236 Petitions in criminal cases are now

231. Id. at 5. What the legislature has denominated a violent felony is a matter of
some debate, particularly since all breaking and enterings of a dwelling are now
considered violent and therefore subject defendants with a record that includes such
an offense, to the artificial increase in guideline sentencing otherwise reserved for
defendants whose records manifest a more plainly dangerous past (e.g., rape, malicious wounding, murder).
232. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01 (Interim Supp. 1995). Class 1 felonies are exempted from this requirement. Id. Cf. Bell v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 146, 442
S.E.2d 427 (1994) (pre-1995 guidelines were wholly discretionary, and absent a sentence outside the statutorily permissible range, sentencing lies within the discretion of
the trial judge).
233. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-298.01(F) (Interim Supp. 1995). Whether such a limitation, in light of the requirement that a trial judge must adhere to the guidelines in
the absence of a written explanation for a departure, complies with minimal due
process requirements is a matter which has not yet been litigated.
234. Ramey v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 300, 450 S.E.2d 775 (1994).
235. West v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 241, 455 S.E.2d (1995). See supra note 108
and accompanying text (discussing unavailability of interlocutory appeal for purpose of
mounting double jeopardy challenge).
236. Telephone Interview with the Clerk's Office of the Virginia Court of Appeals
(June 26, 1995).
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referred directly to a single judge of the court of appeals who
will issue an order either granting the petition or denying it
with an explanation.237 Petitions so granted will be heard on
their merits just as granted petitions have been in the past. 8
Denial orders from a single judge become final orders of the
court of appeals, from which an appeal may be noted to the Supreme Court of Virginia, after the passage of fourteen days,
unless the petitioner elects to argue the petition orally before a
three judge panel of the court of appeals." 9 The intermediary
step of review by a single judge allows for the more expeditious
merits review of petitions clearly deserving close examination,
as well as prompt disposition of those plainly lacking merit. It
also affords criminal litigants the opportunity to argue their
petition before as many as four court of appeals judges, although some of these judges are sure to be from the circuit
court bench sitting by designation.2" Whether the three judge
panel will feel itself constrained to adhere to the decision of its
brother or sister who initially denied the petition remains to be
seen.
Appellate practice will also change as a result of two recent
changes in the composition of the court of appeals and Supreme
Court of Virginia. Judge Lawrence Koontz, Jr. has ascended
from the court of appeals to the Supreme Court of Virginia.
Judge Bernard Barrow passed away shortly after announcing
his retirement from the court of appeals. Both judges could
fairly be characterized as philosophically somewhat to the left
of center241 and how the vacuum they leave will be filled re237. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.05:2(C)-(D) (Repl. Vol. 1988). Note that by virtue of §
17-166.05:2(D), the explanation for the denial is to come from the panel denying the
petition. Practitioners will find, however, that an explanation typically comes from the
single judge denying the petition and that frequently the first question counsel for
petitioner can expect from the three judge panel calls for counsel's analysis of how
the first judge decided the case wrongly.
238. Id. § 17-116.07(A).
239. Id. §§ 17-116.05:2(D), 17-116.08.
240. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-116.01 (Repl. Vol. 1988 & Cun. Supp. 1995).
241. A thumbnail sketch of how the judges of the court of appeals aligned themselves in terms of judicial philosophy can probably be gleaned from the opinions in
the en banc case of Hughes v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 510, 446 S.E.2d 451
(1994) (Moon, C.J., joined by Baker, Willis, and Bray, JJ. for the majority to affirm)
(Coleman, J., concurring and writing separately) (Barrow, J., joined by Koontz, J.,
dissenting) (Benton, J., dissenting, and concurring in part with Judge Barrow's dissent) (Elder, J., dissenting, and concurring in part with Judge Barrow's dissent).
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The legislature has elevated
mains an open question. 2
Fairfax Circuit Court Judge Rosemarie Annunziata and
Hampton Circuit Court Judge Nelson Overton to the court of
appeals.
XII. CONCLUSION

The latter part of 1994 and the beginning of 1995 brought
significant, even fundamental, changes to criminal practice in
the Commonwealth. By the same token, many of these changes
are a direct result of judicial and political philosophies that
trace their roots to some of the Commonwealth's longest-held
traditions. The tension between old analytical paradigms and
new social and political challenges contributes to an ever-evolving and synthesizing body of criminal law. That evolution provides the criminal law practitioner her greatest challenge and
her greatest reward.

242. Justice Koontz's ascension to the Commonwealth's highest court is the latest

step in a long and remarkable career of selfless service to the bar, the judiciary, and
the Commonwealth. His legacy is not yet complete. Judge Barrow leaves the Commonwealth richer for his contributions to a tradition of thoughtful, scholarly, and
compassionate judging. The lawyers, both prosecutors and defense attorneys, who had
the good fortune to appear before Judge Barrow, will sorely miss him.

